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OMNISCIENCE AND TIME, ONE MORE TIME:
A REPLY TO CRAIG
Edward Wierenga

In "Omniscience, Tensed Facts, and Divine Eternity," Faith and Philosophy 17
(2000): 225-241, William Craig objects to my attempt to show what is missing
in standard arguments from facts about knowledge of temporal change to the
conclusion that divine omniscience is incompatible with divine eternity or
atemporality. I had proposed two accounts of the objects of knowledge and
belief according to which what we know changes over time but which permit
God to know everything we know, or everything he needs to know in order to
be omniscient, from an atemporal perspective. I defend this project against
Craig's objections.

William Craig sides with those who hold that divine omniscience is incompatible with divine eternity, and he has recently claimed to "show" that
accounts to the contrary by Jonathan Kvanvig, Brian Leftow, and me are
"untenable".! I can't speak for Kvanvig or Leftow, nor do I propose to
defend their views. But I do have some interest in defending my own
views. In particular, I want to argue that Craig has failed to uncover any
problem with the proposals I had made.
The standard reason for holding that divine omniscience is incompatible
with divine eternity (or divine atemporality) holds that since what we
know changes as time goes by, so God's knowledge must, too. More precisely, it is often held that which propositions or objects of belief are true
changes over time. In that case, anyone who knows all truths would have
to know different propositions at different times; there would be no one
perspective from which someone could know everything.
I think it is clear that for this line of reasoning to succeed it needs to be
supplemented with an account of what the objects of knowledge and belief
are, as well as a statement of exactly what is required for omniscience. In
my view, many of the philosophers who have argued for the incompatibility of divine omniscience and divine eternity have ignored this part of the
project.> I have proposed two alternative accounts of the objects of knowledge and belief, and I have argued that on neither one does it simply follow from facts about change and omniscience that God's knowledge
changes over time.
According to the first of these accounts, the objects of knowledge and
belief are eternal propOSitions-the true ones are always true and the false
ones are always false. What we know when we know that something is
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past or present or future-more generally, what we express by sentences
containing such temporal indexicals as tenses or words like 'now'-are a
peculiar variety of eternal proposition. What changes over time is not
which ones are true but which ones we have access to. We can only believe
propositions to which we have access, so as time goes by, what we know
changes. But nothing would prevent an omniscient being from knowing
all of these truths at once, or from an atemporal, eternal perspective.
The details of this proposal were inspired by a Fregean/ Chisholmian
approach to the problem of knowledge de se, of knowledge of oneself as
oneself. Frege wrote, "Now everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else. So when
Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been wounded, he will probably take as a
basis this primitive way in which he is presented to himself. And only Dr.
Lauben can grasp thoughts determined in this way."3 The idea is that the
object of a first-person belief for a given person is a peculiar proposition
that contains or involves a special individual essence or haecceity of that
person. The last sentence in the passage from Frege is inessential to the
theory: it need not be the case that such first-person propositions are accessible only to the individuals whose haecceities they contain; what matters
is that believing one of your own suffices to give you a belief de se. That
leaves it open that God believes all true "first-person" propositions,
although he gets a de se belief in the process only when the haecceity in
question is his own.
Belief in something as happening in the present is strikingly similar to
believing oneself to have a property.4
Accordingly, the
Fregean/ Chisholmian account can be extended as follows: the proposition
expressed, at a given time, by a sentence using the present tense or the
indexical 'now' is a proposition that involves the individual essence or
haecceity of that time. The sentences
"It is sunny now" uttered or written at 12:20 p.m. on March 23, 2001,

and
"It is, was, or will be sunny at 12:20 p.m. on March 23, 2001"

thus express different propositions. The latter is one that is accessible at
any time or from any temporal or atemporal perspective. The former
expresses a "present-time" proposition that includes the haecceity of the
moment 12:20 p.m., March 23, 2001. As a matter of fact, we are only capable of believing such a proposition at its time. Believing a proposition
expressed by a sentence with a temporal indexical in it accordingly is different from believing a proposition with a non-indexical temporal reference. But the difference, on this account, is not that the former propositions vary in truth over time, while the latter kind are eternal. Rather, both
kinds of propositions are eternal, but our access to and capacity to believe
the former kind is ephemeral. The difference is in us, not in which eternal
propositions are true. Furthermore, it may be that while we are thus limited in our access to present-time propositions, God is not. And just as he
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has a de se belief only when he believes a first-person proposition involving
his own haecceity, so he only has a present-time belief, a belief de praesenti,
if he believes a present-time proposition at its time. Merely knowing a present-time proposition does not give God a temporal position or perspective; it would take knowing one at its time.
Craig claims that this view is "multiply defectiw".' He says that it is
implausible and incomplete. Craig seems to have two reasons for thinking
the view to be implausible. First, he claims that we do not typically have
such propositions involving haecceities of times consciously in mind. He
says, "I may be utterly unconscious of the present lime and certainly am
not forming beliefs about its properties or its haecceity."6 And he adds,
"that is to say, Wierenga's analysis does not provide a plausible account of
the cognitive significance of one's beliefs. I take it as obvious that when I
believe 'it's raining/ I have no beliefs concerning a certain time and the
ascription of a peculiar property to that time, even if the propositional content expressed by a statement of my belief does include such a time and
property. Recall that Wierenga is offering an account of de praesenti belief,
not the propositional content of belief."7
I will take up the question of propositional content below. First, however, I want to note that we are not always very good judges of exactly what
concepts or properties are included in the propositions we believe. Do any
pair of propositions attributing necessarily co-extensive properties to the
same object contain the very same concepts? Some philosophers think
they do; others disagree. At least some of them, then, are mistaken about
what properties they are thinking about when they believe such propositions.
I am not sure that I understand Craig's distinction between belief and its
propositional content, but to the extent that I do, I think my proposal is
about the propositional content of belief, where that is understood as concerning the propositions that are believed. Craig's questions raise serious
and difficult questions about the nature of belief, in fact, questions too difficult to settle here. A way of making my proposal somewhat more plausible, however, begins by noting that if a friend calls me from an unknown
location and says, "I am here," I understand the cognitive significance of
what she says, but I do not know which proposition she expressed-I do
not know the propositional content of her belief. Similarly, if you send me
an undated note which says, "It is sunny now," I can understand the cognitive significance of what you have written, but I do not know which
proposition you asserted. 8 Moreover, if you wrote the same note on two
difference days, it might well be that your mental state is the same on each
day, as is the cognitive significance of the sentence you write. But the
propositions so expressed (and believed) may well be different. My proposal was intended to flesh out that idea.
Hilary Putnam has argued that meaning "ain't in the head."9 He holds,
for e)ample, that what I mean when I think, "There is a glass of water,"
depends on whether I am on earth, where water is H20, or whether I am
on Twin Earth, where the term 'water' refers to a similar but chemically
distinct substance XYZ. Perhaps this context dependence also affects
which proposition I believe. At any rate, it does seem plausible to hold
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that at least part of what it is that we believe is determined by things not in
the consciousness of the believer or "internal" to the believer. What 1
believe when 1 say, "I am here," is determined in part by where I am located. Similarly, what I believe when 1 say, "It is sunny now," is determined
in part by my temporal location. According to the proposal under consideration, the contribution that my temporal location makes to which proposition I express using a present-time indexical is that it provides the haecceity of that time. My talk of "grasping" a proposition obscured this point
that something external to my mental state can contribute to which proposition I believe; it made it seem as though the proposition 1 believe had to
be before my mind's eye in such a way that I could mentally examine it
and tell exactly what its constituents are. Perhaps describing such propositions as "accessible" is less misleading-a proposition is accessible to us if
we are in the right temporal or spatial location and mental state to "hook
up with" it. The important point, in reply to Craig, is that if it is not essential that the propositions we believe are wholly transparent to us, then
even if I am not consciously aware of thinking of the haecceity of a
moment of time, it does not follow that the proposition 1 then believe fails
to include or involve such an haecceity.
Craig's second reason for holding that my proposal is implausible is
that it is not really analogous, he claims, to the haecceitist account of de se
belief that inspired it. He says, "Just as first-person propositions must be
expressed in English via first-person indexicals, so present-time propositions, as Wierenga conceives them, must seemingly be expressed via present-tense indexicals. The absence of temporal indexicals from most of our
tensed beliefs renders implausible the idea that by means of them we grasp
propositions which involve essentially the ascription of properties to a
time."IO
It is no doubt true that many of the sentences we use to express our present time beliefs do not contain such temporal indexicals as 'now', 'at present' or 'currently'. But the present tense of verbs is itself temporally indexical. I had in fact introduced the objection to atemporal omniscience as
claiming that "those [propositions] expressed by sentences containing such
temporally indexical elements as tenses or the word 'now' vary in truth
over time."ll In any event, the phenomenon is surely wide-spread, regardless of the frequency of temporal indexicals. It seems immaterial whether
there is just one linguistic device or several to accomplish the same end.
Realizing that the present tense is temporally indexical is perhaps what
motivates Craig to add a final attack on the plausibility of my proposal.
He writes, "Moreover, Wierenga's analysis of tensed beliefs is drastically
incomplete, since it overlooks all but present-tense beliefs. How are such
beliefs like 'John left at 8:00' or John will come home at 3:00' to be analyzed?,,!2 I should not have thought that the account was incomplete in
this way, since I had written that
we may concentrate in this way on knowledge expressed by sentences with a present time indication, because knowledge expressed
by sentences whose verbs are in the past or future tense is best understood as knowledge that fundamentally involves the present. Thus,
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what we know when we know, for example, that it rained is that it
rained before now. And what we know when we know that it will
rain is that it will rain later than now. In other words, knowledge that
something is past or future is always knowledge that is relative to the
present. 13

In any event, this is how Craig goes on to conjecture that the account
would be developed. But he judges that to be grounds for another objection. He notes that on this view, "the propositional content of God's beliefs
is wholly tenseless, and all he grasps are the tenseless B-relations between
times and events .... Since the attribution to a tenseless time of a property
involving tenseless B-relations of earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than
does not serve to introduce tense, it turns out that what God knows are
wholly tenseless propositions, not present-time propositions.1 4 Craig goes
on to suggest a way in which II/could escape this conclusion." However,
since that is the conclusion for which I was arguing, I have no desire to
escape it. Craig identifies a feature of the proposal, not a flaw: although we
know different propositions at different times, those propositions are eternally true, and God can thus know them without being himself in time. As
far as I can tell, nothing Craig says refutes that possibility.
The proposal we have been discussing assumes that the propositions we
believe when we know what is happening are eternally true. Suppose,
however, that some such propositions really do vary in truth value over
time. In The Nature of God I employed such an account to give a different
reply to the claim that omniscience requires temporality.!S The account in
question is the view that some propositions are perspectival, that is, true or
false only relative to an index, where an index might include a person, a
time, a place, a world, and so forth. 16 Thus, the perspectival proposition I
am sitting might be true relative to <Wierenga, now> but false relative to
<you, now>. And the perspectival proposition It is sunny now might be
true relative to <Wierenga, 12:20 p.m. on March 23, 2001> but false relative
to <Wierenga, 12:20 p.m. on March 24, 2001>. Moreover, we should distinguish believing at an index that a proposition is true, which is what I do
when I believe It is sunny now from my position at <Wierenga, 12:20 p.m.
on March 23, 2001>, from believing that a proposition is true at an index,
which is something anyone does who believes that It is sunny now is true at
<Wierenga, 12:20 p.m. on March 23, 2001>.
If some propositions are perspectival, then omniscience should not be
understood as knowledge of all truths simpliciter; that would leave out
those propositions that are only true relative to some index or other. So a
reasonable account of omniscience would hold instead that
(0) x is omniscient if and only if for any proposition p and perspective <5, t>, (i) if P is true at <5, t>, then x knows that p is true at <5, t>,
and (ii) if x is at <5, t> and p is true at t, then at <5, t> x knows that p.

The first clause requires that an omniscient being know all the eternal
truths-those true at every index-as well as which perspectival propositions
are true at which indices, and the second clause requires in addition that an
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omniscient being know all the perspectival propositions true at the being's
own perspective or index. This definition is thus neutral on whether an
omniscient God is in time or outside of time, which depends not on his
being omniscient but, more sensibly, on whether he is at any temporal perspective.
Craig objects to this account. He writes,
Wierenga's definition of [0] is, however, unacceptably contrived.
For the ostensibly perspectival nature of truth is not a sufficient condition for exempting knowledge of a certain class of propositions
from the concept of omniscience. In Wierenga's view, God has
knowledge of propositions stating exclusively tenseless B-facts, such
as that p is true at t, whereas temporal persons know a multitude of
objectively true propositions which remain unknown to God.
Persons located at t know not merely that p is true at t; they know p
simpliciter, an objectively true proposition of which God is ignorant.
Wierenga redefines omniscience in such a way that a being which
does not know tensed propositions can nonetheless be declared to be
omniscient. But in the absence of independent ground for accepting
[0], such a procedure is unacceptably ad hocY
On one point Craig misunderstands the view. It does not insist that
God has knowledge of "exclusively tenseless B-facts" or knowledge only of
eternal propositions. Indeed, it holds that if God is at any temporal perspective, then to be omniscient he must know the perspectival propositions
true at that perspective. Since it is not part of the view either that God is or
that he is not at any temporal perspective, it does not take a stand on
whether he has knowledge of perspectival propositions.
On the more important, critical point, Craig seems to be mistaken. The
definition (0) does not seem to me to be ad hoc at all, much less "unacceptably" so. For one thing, it has been standard since late antiquity to hold
that omnipotence does not require the ability to do absolutely anything:
there are limitations on ability compatible with being omnipotent. What
would be wrong with adding that there are similar restrictions on omniscience, that some limitations on knowledge are compatible with being
omniscient? Moreover, it is somewhat misleading to describe the view as
allowing that there is a "multitude of objectively true propositions which
remain unknown to God" and that temporal persons "know not merely
that p is true at t; they know p simpliciter, an objectively true proposition of
which God is ignorant." For the perspectival propositions which God does
not know are not really true simpliciter but only relative to or at some index
or other. Moreover, it seems only sensible to hold that God does not know
such propositions from the point of view of any index at which he is not.
And surely he is not at some indices, for example, <Craig, t> (for any time
t), for God could not be at such an index without being identical to Craig.
Thus, when Craig knows the perspectival proposition I am in La Mirada,
California now at the index <Craig, t>, Craig knows something at an index
which God cannot know at that index. Given the close analogies between
first-person knowledge and present-time knowledge, it seems only natural
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to hold that God similarly lacks knowledge of any perspectival proposition
true only at indices at which he is not temporally present, if such there are.
I do not know whether either of the two accounts I have presented is
likely to withstand more sustained scrutiny. But I am confident that they
continue to serve their intended purpose, which is to show a glaring lacuna
in the standard attempts to derive God's temporality from his omniscience
and facts about change over time. If the former account, or something like
it, is correct, then the propositions we know fleetingly and only at certain
times when we have temporal knowledge are propositions that are nevertheless eternally true and available for God to know whatever his temporal
position. If the second account is correct, then the propositions we know
when we have present-time knowledge are perspectival propositions, true
only relative to certain temporal indices at which we are present. Whether
God knows them depends, not on whether he is omniscient, but on
whether he is located at any temporal indices. Anyone who wants to
argue from the facts of temporal change that divine omniscience requires
divine temporality, therefore, owes us at a minimum an account of the
objects of temporal knowledge and belief. In addition, the objector should
proVIde enough details about the nature of omniscience for us to see what
it requires in the way of knowledge of these objects. Finally, if the correct
account of our knowledge of the present admits of perspectival propositions, then the objector should also provide independent reasons for thinking that God is located at temporal indices or perspectives. To my knowledge, no one has attempted any of this.
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